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1 Introduction
Among the recent approaches to conceive a more realistic model of human behavior by extending economic
theory by aspects that go beyond narrow self-interest, reciprocity has been prominent, both in theoretical
(e.g. Rabin, 1993, Falk and Fischbacher, 1999, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) and experimental work
(e.g. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995, Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993). The focus of the literature
has so far been almost exclusively on direct reciprocity, where a person who is a¤ected by the choice of
another person can directly reward or punish the latter. Often, though, it is not possible to reward or
punish a person directly. In particular in large societies repaying a favor directly can be di¢cult. So, the
focus of our experimental study is indirect reciprocity, where friendly or hostile acts of one person towards
another are rewarded or punished by a third party.1
The term “indirect reciprocity” was introduced by Alexander (1987). He argues that individuals’ behav-
ior towards others is not only in‡uenced by their own experience but also by their observations of other’s
behavior. According to Alexander, indirect reciprocity works through reputation and status and provides
the evolutionary basis for moral systems prescribing cooperation.2
Harbaugh (1998) argues (and provides supporting …eld data) that donations to charity are in part
driven by a prestige motive. The bene…t of such prestige might come from indirect reciprocity, because
donations might be rewarded by outside observers. Indeed, Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck (2002b)
have shown that in an experiment donations to UNICEF are rewarded by other players. This allows for
important e¤ects of strategic behavior. If at least some others are indirectly reciprocal, it can pay to
strategically build a reputation for being generous. This in turn allows a potential recipient of a donation
to increase the revenues by publishing donations. The latter should increase future returns of the donor
on his contribution and hence his incentive to give. Apparently charities are aware of the prestige motive
(which might be driven by expectations of indirect reciprocity) since it is common practice to announce
1We provide a detailed review of the recent literature on indirect reciprocity in Section 4.
2In an alternative model of indirect reciprocity, a person that has been helped then helps a third party. Boyd and Richerson
(1989) study this form of indirect reciprocity in small cyclical networks.
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donors’ names and contributions. The interplay of indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building
can thus have substantial impact on economically relevant interaction.3
Seinen and Schram (2001) have conducted an experimental helping game (a degenerate game where a
donor can help a recipient at a cost smaller than the recipient’s bene…t) to explore indirect reciprocity.
A subject’s previous helping decisions were stored in a so-called image score and the recipient’s score was
presented to the donor before he decided whether to help or not. This game is nicely suited to study indirect
reciprocity because it precludes (in anonymous su¢ciently large groups) any e¤ects of direct reciprocity as
opposed to games such as the prisoner’s dilemma. Seinen and Schram (2001) …nd that indirect reciprocity
is important, which means that many donors base their helping decision on the image score of the recipient.
A substantial part of the donors, however, also base their decision on their own image score, indicating
that strategic reputation building is a major force as well.4
To assess the interplay of indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building, it is necessary to clearly
distinguish between the possible motives that drive helping choices. An experimental design that achieves
this aim thus has to allow us to identify whether observed helping choices are motivated by strategic
reputation building or by indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by incentives for strategic reputation
building by the donor, which we call pure indirect reciprocity. In Seinen and Schram observability of the
recipient’s score implies that the donor’s score will be observable in the future as well. Therefore, their
design does not allow them to study pure indirect reciprocity uncontaminated by strategic concerns. It is
also di¢cult to get a clear idea of the overall impact of strategic reputation building. While they …nd that
a substantial part of subjects base their decisions at least in part on their own score, it is not possible to
3Andreoni and Petrie (2004) provide further experimental evidence on the prestige motive. They show that subjects, when
having the options to contribute both to an anonymous and a broadcast public good, overwhelmingly choose the latter. Beyond
indirect reciprocity, reputation building can be crucial for the functioning of markets with repeated one-shot interactions. This
is increasingly relevant in markets that are becoming larger and more anonymous and hence less prone to be in‡uenced by
direct reciprocity as is exempli…ed by e-commerce. Bolton et al. (2004b) and Keser (2002) provide experimental evidence on
the importance of reputation mechanisms in environments with repeated one-shot interactions.
4Wedekind and Milinski (2000) provide the …rst experimental test of indirect reciprocity, based on only six periods. They
…nd support for indirect reciprocity in the sense that recipients who are helped have had higher scores on average than
recipients who are not helped. Furthermore, donors who rarely help rather do so when the recipient has a high image score.
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clearly determine the share of helping choices that are due to strategic reputation building.
To disentangle these two e¤ects, we use a helping game where in any period only half of the players have
a public image score, the record of their previous behavior. In particular, each subject has a public image
score either in the …rst 40 periods of the experiment or in the last 40 periods. This allows us to identify
the motivation behind the helping choices. First, since donors without a public image score interact with
recipients with a public image score, we can study pure indirect reciprocity uncontaminated by incentives
for strategic reputation building. Second, by comparing the behavior of donors with and without public
scores, we can evaluate the relative impact of strategic reputation building on the helping rates. Our design
allows us to study the latter issue even within subjects.
We test three hypotheses. First, indirect reciprocity is important, i.e. the probability that donors help
increases in the recipient’s image score. Second, subjects strategically build a reputation, i.e. for any given
score of the recipient (including an absent score) the average helping rate of donors with a public image
score is higher than that of donors without. Third, strategic reputation building weakens the reciprocal
relation, i.e. the dependence of the donor’s helping rate on the recipient’s score is weaker for donors with
a public score than for donors without.
We …nd support for all three hypotheses. There is a clear positive relation between helping rates and
recipients’ scores for both donors with and without a public score. The latter provides evidence for indirect
reciprocity even in the absence of strategic incentives for reputation building, hence for pure indirect
reciprocity. Our experiment thus provides, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst evidence of pure indirect
reciprocity in the laboratory.5 The average helping rate of donors with a public score is, however, more than
twice the average helping rate of donors without. Hence strategic reputation building plays an important
role as well. There is also clear evidence on an individual level: 80% of the subjects help clearly more
often when they have a score than when they do not, including 25% who never help when they do not have
a public score, but often help when they have a public score. The mode of donors’ public scores is at 4
helping decisions out of the last 5 decisions. This score is the expected payo¤ maximizing score in all …ve
sessions. In contrast, if scores are not public, the mode is clearly at 0.
5We also …nd substantial helping rates (32%) in interactions where neither the donor nor the recipient has a score. This
suggests that motives like altruism or e¢ciency concerns play an important role as well.
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More generally, our design allows us to draw a clean distinction between non-strategic cooperative
behavior and cooperative behavior driven by strategic reputation building. Our results clearly show that
both non-strategic and strategic cooperative behavior are of substantial importance.
Besides its importance for understanding the interaction of strategic and reciprocal behavior, our ex-
periment also provides a test for models of the evolution of human cooperation. Looking for explanations
for the existence of indirect reciprocity, Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) have conducted simulations of an
evolutionary process based on a repeated helping game. They …nd that maximally discriminating players
will eventually take over the population.6 Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), however, show that this result
is based on a too restricted initial set of available strategies. They show that subjects who are not indirectly
reciprocal but only help in order to keep their own score at a level that induces a high probability of being
helped (and hence base their decision only on their own score), could invade and take over a population
of image scorers (i.e. players who base their choice only on the recipient’s score).7 Hence, such strategic
reputation building could undermine a cooperative society based on indirect reciprocity. The underlying
reason is that it is cheaper to keep one’s own score at a level that maximizes expected returns by keeping
it constantly at the optimal level without paying attention to the recipient’s score.
Our experimental results show that about 15% of the population are pure strategist who are not recip-
rocal. This is the kind of behavior predicted by Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) to invade an indirectly
reciprocal population. Furthermore, our experimental results show that payo¤s relative to group averages
are clearly higher for strongly strategic subjects (whose helping rates are generally at least doubled when
they have a score) than for the weakly strategic subjects (whose helping rates are not substantially higher
6For a helping game where the image score is based only on the last decision, Nowak and Sigmund (1998b) have shown
analytically that discriminators outperform altruists and defectors but that cycles occur due to invasion of discriminator
populations by altruists, which in turn yields an advantage to defectors.
7Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) also study strategies that use both the donor’s and the recipient’s score. For a case with
perfect information they …nd that a type who is maximally discriminating with respect to the recipient’s score but in addition
only helps if his own score is threatening to fall below this threshold, is most frequent. Leimar and Hammerstein (2001),
however, argue, using comparable simulations, that this result requires either a substantial in‡uence of genetic drift or a very
small cost of helping. Even in the latter case, cooperative image scorers are invaded by sophisticated strategic subjects who
build, based on previous experience, a belief whether it pays to have a positive image score.
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when they have a score). They are also higher for the non-reciprocal than for the reciprocal subjects (though
not signi…cantly). These results are consistent with the invasion argument by Leimar and Hammerstein
(2001) and cast some doubts on the evolutionary explanation for indirect reciprocity suggested by Nowak
and Sigmund (1998a).
Finally, our experiment also provides a test of di¤erent reciprocity models. While the models by Rabin
(1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) cannot be generalized from direct to indirect reciprocity,
the models by Levine (1998) and by Charness and Rabin (2002) can also be interpreted as models of both
direct and indirect reciprocity. In the model by Levine (1998) the intensity of empathy towards another
person depends on the altruism of that person. This altruism can, for example, be inferred from the
behavior towards a third person, implying indirect reciprocity. In Charness and Rabin (2002) people are
assumed to exhibit “concern withdrawal”, i.e. they assign a lower (or even negative) weight to another
person’s payo¤ in the own utility function if that person has not behaved well, which could, for example,
been by the mistreatment of a third person.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the helping game and the experimental design. The
results are presented in Section 3, followed by a discussion of related literature in Section 4. Section 5
summarizes our results and provides concluding remarks.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1 The Helping Game
We conducted a computerized repeated helping game similar to the game studied by Nowak and Sigmund
(1998a) and Seinen and Schram (2001). There were 16 subjects in each of our …ve experimental sessions.
The helping game was repeated for 80 periods. In each period the subjects were randomly matched
(independently between periods) in pairs and the role of donor and recipient were randomly assigned. The
donor had the choice whether or not to help the recipient at a cost of 6 “Points”, which yielded a bene…t
of 15 Points for the recipient. The recipient had no choice to make.
Each subject had a public score either in the …rst 40 periods or in the last 40 periods. All subjects were
informed about this before the start of the experiment. The common knowledge of this change of roles
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ensured that subjects were in a symmetric position and hence it precluded that donors with and without
score behaved di¤erently because they considered themselves advantaged or disadvantaged.8 A public score
consisted of the number of times the subject had helped and had not helped in the last 5 times as a donor.
In case the subject had so far been in the role of the donor less than 5 times, the score consisted of the
total number of help and not help decisions so far. When the recipient had a public score, the donor
was informed about this score before making the decision to help. A subject with a public score was also
informed about her or his own score. In case the subject did not have a public score, no score information
was displayed (but of course, subjects could easily keep track of their own score). The experimental software
did, however, also record the private scores to allow an easy comparison of the choices with and without
public score. A score that is based on more than the last period allows in principle for punishments,
because a player who generally helps can occasionally punish a free-rider without being punished himself if
the indirectly reciprocal players do not demand a perfectly clean record. It is, however, impossible with our
information structure to distinguish punishment from occasional defection. This would require higher-order
information, i.e. information about the score of the recipients whom the current recipient did and did not
help in previous periods.
Of course, classical game theory based on common knowledge of narrow sel…shness and rationality
implies no help in the one-shot game and by backward induction for the …nitely repeated game. In an
in…nitely repeated helping game, however, it is a Nash-equilibrium when all players choose the strategy
to help if and only if they have always been helped and all the recipients that they observed so far had a
perfect score. On the equilibrium path all players would then help. This is, however, less straightforward
than such trigger strategy equilibria in, e.g., a prisoner’s dilemma game. If a player does not help in one
period, this is only observed by the current partner, and hence not all players will immediately switch to
not helping. As a consequence a player who observed a deviation and who has a public score will in early
periods not switch to not helping, because this would immediately a¤ect his own score, while cooperation
8While subjects might have considered having a score advantageous or disadvantageous, they knew that they would not
be advantaged or disadvantaged over the whole course of the experiment. In a design that simply mixed subjects with and
without score, behavioral di¤erences between them might be caused by feelings of being assigned to the inferior role.
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will break down in general only after several periods. Hence the break down of cooperation will come with
delay. The most important aspect of such an equilibrium is, however, that it requires full helping at all
times. If all subjects used the same cut-o¤ strategies which is less demanding than a perfect score, then
there are two options: …rst, these strategies could condition only on the current recipient’s score. If this
is the case, a player would only have an incentive to keep his own score just at this cut-o¤ level, but no
incentive to be reciprocal, i.e. to apply a cut-o¤ strategy himself. Second, the strategies might also be
sensitive towards whether other subjects are reciprocal. In that case a subject would stop being reciprocal
when at least once she is not rewarded although her score is above the cut-o¤ level (for short-term reasons,
she might switch temporarily to score-optimizing behavior and later to not helping). This, however, would
lead to an eventual complete breakdown of helping if ever a subject is not reciprocal. This in turn implies
that there will never be a deviation from always helping, because as long as all have helped, a decision
not to help would also mean not being reciprocal, which would in turn lead to a breakdown of reciprocity.
The main conclusion is that even in an in…nite game there cannot be an equilibrium where players behave
reciprocally but not all players help all the time. Even if one allows for errors non-perfect cooperation
cannot be an equilibrium, because if players are tolerant towards other players’ errors, this would create
an incentive not to help at least occasionally.
Similarly, one can consider a …nitely repeated game with a small number of intrinsically motivated
reciprocal players and equilibria where sel…sh players try to mimic such a reciprocal player. This, however,
does not work, because the score does not provide information about a player’s reciprocal behavior (this
would require higher order information), but only about his helping behavior. Hence strategic players will
optimize their own score, but not behave reciprocally (unless the intrinsic reciprocal players also react
towards whether others treat them reciprocally, as discussed above). If su¢ciently many other players help
in order to maximize their own score, it would even pay not to help at all and hence cooperation would
break down immediately (unless the number of intrinsically motivated reciprocal players is rather large).
2.2 Experimental Procedures
The experimental software was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) and the experiments were run in
the computer laboratory at the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics of the University of Zurich
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in Fall 2001. Participants were students from a variety of …elds from the University of Zurich and the
ETH Zurich and were recruited by telephone. They were randomly assigned to seats in the laboratory.
Instructions were provided in written form and participants could read through them at their own pace
(see the appendix for an English translation). Donor and recipient roles were labeled A and B in the
instructions, but the helping choices were labeled as such, because we considered the game structure so
obvious, that the use of the word “help” would not invoke any interpretations that subjects would otherwise
not come up with. More neutral terminology would instead appear plainly arti…cial. At the end of the
instructions there were …ve control questions to check that participants had understood the key features
of the experiment. The experiment started when all participants had answered all the control questions
correctly and after an oral summary of the instructions had been given.
From the second period on, subjects were informed about the outcome of the last period. At the same
time they were asked to make a decision or were informed that they were a recipient. The upper part of the
screen reviewed their role in the preceding period, the donor’s decision and the resulting payo¤ and total
payo¤ so far, as well as their own score if they had a public score in that half of the experiment. A donor
was asked for his choice in the lower part of the screen and there he was either informed about the score
of the recipient or that the recipient did not have a public score. A recipient was only informed about his
role and that he did not have to make a choice. Following period 40, the roles of subjects with and without
public score were switched and the scores were set to 0.
At the end of the experiment Points were converted into Swiss Francs at a rate of 1 Point = 0.1 Swiss
Franc. Subjects started the experiment with an endowment of 100 Points, corresponding to a show-up fee
of 10 Swiss Francs. No additional show-up fee was paid. The sessions took between 64 and 81 minutes and
earnings ranged from 6.40 to 55.60 Swiss Francs with an average of 29.36 Swiss Francs (including the 10
Francs initial endowment).9
9At the time of the experiment, one Swiss Franc was about $ 0.61 or 0.68 Euros.
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Figure 1: Donors’ average help rate for all recipients with a public score based on at least one decision
3 Experimental Results
The overall experimental results are displayed in Figures 1 and 2, which show the average helping behavior
of donors with and without score for di¤erent public scores of the recipients. The latter are represented
as the relative number of helping choices, i.e. the number of helping choices in the last …ve help decisions
divided by …ve, or if the score was based on less than …ve choices, the number of helping choices divided by
the total number of choices (and rounded to multiples of 0.2). In Figure 1 all choices where recipients had
a public score based on at least one decision are included, in Figure 2 only the decisions where recipients
had a full score, i.e. a score based on …ve decisions are included. Average helping rates for the individual
sessions by score status of donors and recipients are presented in Table 1 (for all scores of the recipients
aggregated and only including recipients with a full public or private score). Table 1 shows in particular
that helping rates are quite high (32%) even when neither the donor nor the recipient has a score, i.e. in
a situation where indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building cannot play a role. This suggests
that additional motives like altruism or e¢ciency concerns are important as well.
Result 1: Donors both with a public and a private score help recipients with a higher score more often.
The helping behavior of donors with a private score implies in particular that non-strategic cooperative
behavior is important.
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Figure 2: Donors’ average help rate for recipients with full public score
Figures 1 and 2 provide immediate support for the …rst hypothesis that donors are indirectly reciprocal
and in particular for the existence of pure indirect reciprocity. The helping rate of donors both with and
without public score clearly increases with the image score of the recipient, although the relation is monotone
only in the case where donors do not have a score and recipients have a full score. A straightforward
statistical test con…rms the signi…cance of this positive relation. The H0 hypothesis is that donors do
not condition their helping decision on the recipient’s score. We conduct a simple binomial test for this
hypothesis based on the …ve sessions as independent observations. To obtain an estimate whether there is
a positive relation between the recipient’s score and the helping probability we estimate for each session
independently a simple linear probability model
Pr(H elp)j = const + ® ¢ RsScorej + "j;
where Pr(Help) is the probability that the donor helps the recipient, RsScore is the recipient’s score and
"j is a normally distributed error term.10 Under H0 in each individual session the probability that the
10The linear probability model is clearly not the ideal model to analyze the dependence of the help rate on the recipient’s
score. Here, however, we only use it to provide us with an input for the simple non-parametric test whether there is a
positive relation between the recipient’s score and the help probability. For this test it is also irrelevant if coe¢cients are not
signi…cantly di¤erent from 0, as long as they are positive.
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Session 1 2 3 4 5 Total
R with D with score 72% 78% 70% 66% 86% 74%
score D without score 45% 42% 22% 27% 49% 37%
R without D with score 72% 66% 63% 66% 75% 69%
score D without score 46% 32% 13% 21% 47% 32%
Table 1: Average help rates by score status of donors (D) and recipients (R), recipients with full score only
estimated coe¢cient for the recipient’s score is positive is 12 (actually slightly smaller, because of a small
positive probability for a ‡at relation). Hence, since the sessions are independent, the probability for a
positive coe¢cient in all …ve sessions is (slightly smaller than)
¡
1
2
¢5 = 132 < 5%. Since we …nd a positive
coe¢cient in all …ve sessions we can thus reject the H0 that there is no positive relation at the 5% level.11
This holds independently of whether we include all recipients with a score or only the recipients with a full
score and whether we consider donors with or without score (see Table 2).
The a¢rmative result for the …rst hypothesis can also be derived from a panel data analysis (with the
sessions as independent units of observations). We use a random-e¤ects probit model.12 The model is
Pr(Help)it = ©(const + ® ¢ RsScoreit);
with, as above, Pr(Help) the probability that the donor helps the recipient, RsScore the recipient’s score,
and © the normal cumulative distribution function. We again run the regression separately for donors with
and without score, to be able to detect whether a reciprocal relation might be restricted to one group of
donors. Table 3 lists the estimates for the coe¢cients, the standard errors, z-statistics and p-values. No
matter whether we include all recipients with a score or restrict the analysis to those with a full score, both
for donors with and without scores the coe¢cient for the recipient’s score is positive and highly signi…cant
(p < 0:1%): Obviously, the same results occur if we run the regression jointly for all donors with and
without score.
11The same logic will apply to all our non-parametric tests below. Since all our hypotheses are directed, we can apply
one-sided tests throughout.
12All reported results are qualitatively the same for a logit model.
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Session 1 2 3 4 5
All All donors
:56
(8:1)
:59
(6:4)
:47
(6:1)
:51
(5:2)
:57
(3:9)
recipients donors with score
:55
(8:7)
:58
(9:2)
:52
(8:3)
:43
(4:4)
:34
(2:2)
with score donors without score
:53
(7:0)
:75
(10:2)
:36
(4:7)
:64
(8:9)
:66
(4:5)
recipients All donors
:65
(9:0)
:74
(8:8)
:51
(5:3)
:46
(3:9)
:72
(5:7)
with full donors with score
:60
(7:6)
:62
(8:3)
:44
(3:7)
:30
(1:3)
:32
(1:3)
score donors without score
:69
(10:8)
:93
(13:7)
:49
(6:8)
:69
(10:8)
:87
(7:2)
Table 2: Coe¢cients for recipient’s score in linear probability model for helping choice. Adjusted R2 (in
percent) in parantheses.
The high average helping rate of donors without a public score (37% if recipients have a public score,
32% if they do not) is clear evidence of non-strategic cooperative behavior, because these donors do not
have an incentive to help to build a reputation that would bene…t them.
Result 2: Donors with a public score help substantially more often than donors with a private score.
Hence strategic cooperative behavior is of crucial importance as well.
Figures 1 and 2 as well as Table 1 provide clear support for the second hypothesis that donors try
to strategically build a reputation. The average helping rate of donors with score is higher than of those
without for any score of the recipient (including absent score, as can be seen from Table 1).13 The same
holds for each individual session. In case only recipients with full score are considered, there is only one
13If the analysis is restricted to recipients with full score, then the helping rate of both donors with and without score is 0
for recipients with a score 0. There are, however, only 13 interactions with a recipient with a full score of 0. 12 of these are
with the same subject and hence all in session 1. Furthermore, since the helping rate for donors without score is already 0 for
recipients with a score of 0.2, this tie appears to simply result from censoring.
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Coe¢cient Std. Error z Pr > jzj
Donors All R with ® 1.6028 0.2277 7.04 0.000
with score const -0.4694 0.1758 -2.67 0.008
scores R with ® 1.517 0.2756 5.50 0.000
full score const -0.4547 0.2090 -2.17 0.030
Donors All R with ® 1.7893 0.2238 8.00 0.000
without score const -1.6893 0.1854 -9.11 0.000
scores R with ® 2.328 0.2854 8.16 0.000
full score const -2.1379 0.2661 -8.03 0.000
Table 3: Coe¢cients for the recipient’s score (®) in probit model for the help choice
tie, in session 1 for a score of 0. Such a dominance of the helping rate of donors with a score over that of
donors without a score occurs in one session under the H0 hypothesis that strategic reputation building is
not relevant with probability less than 12 : Thus the fact that it holds in all …ve sessions allows us to reject
the H0 at the 5% level.
This result as well is supported by a panel data analysis. We extend the above model to
Pr(Help)it = ©(const + ® ¢ RsScoreit + ¯ ¢ DWithScoreit);
with DWithScore a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor has a score and 0 otherwise and the other
variables as above. Both running the regression for all recipients with a score or only for those with a full
score, yields a highly signi…cant (p < 0:1%) coe¢cient for the dummy, supporting the second hypothesis
(see Table 4).
As can be seen in Table 1, in each session for both recipients with and without score the helping rates
of donors with score is about twice the helping rate of donors without score. Hence the impact of strategic
reputation building is not only statistically signi…cant, but also of substantial magnitude. On the other
hand, both for donors with and without score, the average helping rate is only slightly (about 5%) lower
if the recipient does not have a score than when he does. Hence recipients without a score are treated
roughly as if they had an average score. This indicates that donors do not create any self-serving beliefs
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Coe¢cient Std. Error z Pr > jzj
All R ® 1.6513 0.1605 10.29 0.000
with ¯ 1.1277 0.0720 15.66 0.000
score const -1.618 0.1535 -10.54 0.000
R with ® 1.8824 0.1974 9.53 0.000
full ¯ 1.0852 0.0812 13.36 0.000
score const -1.8302 0.1623 -11.28 0.000
Table 4: Coe¢cients for the recipient’s score (®) and for a dummy whether the donor has a score (¯) in
probit model for the help choice
that recipients about whom they do not receive information are not helpful, which in turn could justify not
helping these recipients.
The importance of strategic reputation building is also very vividly illustrated by Figure 3 which shows
the distribution (absolute frequencies on top of bars) of donors’ full (public or private) scores.1 4 The dark
bars show the distribution for donors with private scores and the light bars for donors with public scores.
In the former case, the mode is with about 40 % at a score of 0, with almost a uniform distribution over
the remaining scores. For public scores, in contrast, the mode of the distribution is at a relative score of
0.8 (i.e. 4), with few cases of scores below 0.6 and hardly any below 0.4.15 Interestingly, in all sessions
the score that maximizes expected payo¤s for the observed helping rates is 0.8 (see Table 5). This implies
that either many subjects manage to strategically optimize their score, or that many subjects use the most
prevalent score as a cut-o¤ point. As Table 5 shows, it appears in general optimal to keep the score at or
14We included all full scores following the donor’s decision, except for scores resulting from a donor’s decision in the last
period, because in that case the resulting score could not possibly be relevant for future interaction. The total number of
the included scores is 2480, 1227 where the score is public and 1253 where the score is private (the di¤erence is a result of
the random allocation of donor and recipient roles, apparently it just happened that players with a private score were chosen
slightly more often as donors). Since participants could be a donor (or a recipient) several periods in a row, some of these
scores may have never (or several times) been observed.
15Of the 19 full scores of 0, 15 come from the same subject, the only pure egoist. In all …ve sessions the mode for private
scores is 0. For public scores the mode is 0.8 in three sessions. In one session the mode is 0.6 and in one session it is 1, with
0.8 being the second most frequent score in both cases.
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Figure 3: Distribution of public and private (post-decision) donors’ scores for all interactions where the
donor had a full score (except for following donors’ decisions in the last period). Absolute numbers appear
on the top of the bars.
close to 0.8 (this analysis does not take time trends into account, the optimal score is calculated based on
average help rates over the whole phase with full scores). The high returns on a score of 0.2 in session 2
and on 0.4 in session 5 can be attributed to low numbers of observations (1 and 3, respectively).
Result 3: There is substantial heterogeneity in behavior both in terms of indirect reciprocity and strategic
reputation building.
An advantage of our design is that we can also study the importance of strategic reputation building on
an individual basis by comparing the helping rates with and without score within subjects. Table 6 shows
a classi…cation of subjects. We call a subject strategic if the helping rates are generally higher in the part
of the experiment where the sub ject has a score than in the part where he or she does not. A subject is
called strongly strategic if the helping rates with score are in most cases at least twice the helping rate
without score.1 6 Finally, a pure strategist never helps when he or she does not have a score, but does so
16For the classi…cation of both strategic and strongly strategic, we allowed deviations from the criteria for one value of the
recipient’s score and in that case required it to hold strictly for at least two values of the recipient’s score. In particular we
required the criterium to hold for the case where the recipient did not have a score, because the number of observations was
much higher than for any single recipient’s score.
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Session
Score
1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 -0.6 2.9 0.57 -0.6 -0.6 0.57
0.4 0.55 0.91 1.11 1.03 2.3 1.03
0.6 2.1 1.2 1.22 0.87 1.8 1.39
0.8 2.52 3.01 1.51 2.63 2.85 2.42
1 2.07 2.48 1.11 0.81 2.62 1.92
Table 5: Average expected return per period (in Points) from keeping a certain score, based on average
help rates over the whole phase with full scores
several times otherwise.17 There are several special cases of non-strategic subjects. Simple egoists never
help, simple altruists always help and negatively reciprocal altruists always help when the recipient does
not have a score or when the recipient’s score is above some cut-o¤ level, but not for a lower score. A
subject is classi…ed as reciprocal when there is a clear positive relation between the recipient’s score and
the helping rate.18
As Table 6 shows, the majority of subjects is clearly strategic, there are only 16 (20%) non-strategic
players, but even 20 pure strategists and 23 strong strategists. The distribution of types does not depend
substantially on whether the subjects have a score in the …rst or the second half of the experiment. It
also does not di¤er a lot between sessions, but the concentration of pure and strong strategist is especially
high (75%) in session 3. Interestingly, session 3 also has the highest number of reciprocal subjects (62.5%).
There is only one simple egoist, and even more surprisingly only one negatively reciprocal altruist, which
17Note that the pure strategists were not included in the strong strategists.
18We allowed one exception from the criterium in the sense that for one low score the helping rate was allowed to be higher
than for one or several higher scores or for one high score the helping rate was allowed to be lower than for one or several
lower scores. In these cases we required at least two either low scores where the helping rate was lower than that for all higher
scores or high scores where the helping rate was higher than for each lower score. A ‡at helping rate in case the donor did not
have a score was allowed if the helping rate in case he did have a score showed a clear positive relation. For most subjects,
the classi…cation was straightforward, because there was either a clear monotone relation or none at all.
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Pure Strat Strong Str. Weak Str. Non-Str. Total
Reciprocal 8 12 14 4 (5) 38 (39)
Non-Reciprocal 12 11 7 6 (11) 36 (41)
Simple Egoist 1 1
Simple Altruist 4 4
Negativ Rec. Altr. 1 1
Total 20 23 21 16 80
Table 6: Classi…cation of individual subjects (in absolute numbers). Numbers in parantheses include special
types of reciprocal (negatively reciprocal altruist) and non-reciprocal (simple egoist and simple altruist)
non-strategic types. These types are listed separately in the third to …fth rows.
intuitively appears to be a perfectly reasonable and in particular socially desirable type (helps in general
but punishes egoists). Some of the 4 simple altruists might be negatively reciprocal altruists, because they
never encountered a recipient with a score below 0.4. Overall, the number of these simple types is much
lower than in Seinen and Schram (2001), who …nd 11% egoists and 36% altruists.1 9 Thus we …nd a higher
share of subjects who are reciprocal but also a higher share that are strategic. Interestingly, 40% of the pure
strategists and 52% of the strong strategist are also clearly reciprocal. Hence while their primary motive to
help appears to be strategic reputation building, they are also concerned with providing incentives for the
other subjects and hence instead of just exploiting the cooperative system based on indirect reciprocity,
they also stabilize it.20 The remaining 60% of pure strategists (15% of the total population), however,
appear to be of the type predicted by Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) to invade the population.
Result 4: Strategic incentives to build a reputation weaken the reciprocal behavior
To test our third hypothesis that the reciprocal relation is weaker for donors with score than for donors
without, we have to de…ne measures for the reciprocal relation. There are two way to operationalize this
19The numbers are, however, not perfectly comparable, because we use a di¤erent classi…cation than Seinen and Schram
(2001). In particular, our design allows us to more clearly detect strategic players and hence our classi…cation is …ner in that
respect.
20This can be seen as being strategic on a higher level, because due to the matching procedure, donors could pro…t from
inducing others to help, either by later being matched with them again or by indirect e¤ects.
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concept. First, since donors with public scores have to be concerned about their own score, they cannot
solely condition their helping decision on the recipient’s score. Therefore, the correlation between their
helping decision and the recipient’s score should be weaker. A second measure, that we use here, is the
slope of a linear regression between helping decision and the recipient’s score. This slope is a measure of
the reciprocity of the donor. Consequently, it expresses the average incentive for the subjects with public
score. It is easier for the subjects with private scores to establish this incentive (because subjects with
public score might also help recipients with low score in order to keep up their own score). Therefore,
we expect them to have a steeper slope. Indeed, if we focus on the recipients with a full score (which
appears appropriate, because the preceding interactions are sub ject to more random in‡uence due to initial
experimentation of donors), then Table 2 shows that in each session the coe¢cient of the recipient’s score
in the linear probability model is higher for donors without score than for donors with score. Hence the
relation between the recipient’s score and the helping probability is stronger for donors without score than
for donors with score in each session, and thus overall is signi…cantly stronger for the donors without score
at p = 5%: We can also address this question by a second measure, the adjusted R2 for each regression.
As is shown in Table 2, the adjusted R2 is higher for the donors without a score than for the donors with
a score in each session, and hence overall, the recipient’s score is a (signi…cantly) better predictor for the
helping probability if the donor does not have a score.2 1 If we consider all recipients with a score, however,
both these tests fail and hence the overall support for the third hypothesis is weaker than for the …rst two
hypotheses.
These result are again supported by a panel data analysis. We further extend the above model to
Pr(Help)it = ©(const + ® ¢ RsScoreit + ¯ ¢ DW ithScoreit + ° ¢ (DWithScore £ RsScore)it)
where the interaction term DWithScore£RsScore captures the additional e¤ect of the recipient’s score in
case the donor has a score and the other variables are de…ned as above. As shown in Table 7, the coe¢cient
for the interaction term is signi…cantly (p < 5%) negative if we restrict the analysis to the recipients with
21The …t of the model is in general not very good because donors’ behavior is quite heterogenous. This, however, rather
strengthens the result since still a clear e¤ect can be detected.
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Coe¢cient Std. Error z Pr > jzj
All ® 1.7467 0.2248 7.77 0.000
R ¯ 1.3043 0.2547 5.12 0.000
with ° -0.2275 0.3192 -0.71 0.476
score const -1.7648 0.1858 -9.50 0.000
R ® 2.3425 0.2832 8.27 0.000
with ¯ 1.7892 0.3102 5.77 0.000
full ° -0.9319 0.3945 -2.36 0.018
score const -2.1936 0.2294 -9.56 0.000
Table 7: Coe¢cients for the recipient’s score (®), for a dummy whether the donor has a score (¯ ) and for
the interaction term (°) in probit model for the help choice
full score, supporting the third hypothesis that the impact of the recipient’s score is weaker if the donor
has a score. If we consider all recipients with a score, however, the coe¢cient is again negative, but far
from signi…cant (p > 40%):
We …nd furter support for stratgic reputation building by extending our probit model to
Pr(Help)it = ©(const + ® ¢ RsScoreit + ¯ ¢ DW ithScoreit + ° ¢ (DWithScore £ RsScore)it
+± ¢ DsScoreit + ´ ¢ (DWithScore £ DsScore)it)
including the donor’s own score DsScore and an interaction term DW ithScore£ DsScore. The …rst term
essentially captures individividual di¤erences in the propensity to help. Donors who help more often have
a higher score and hence in general the current score and the probability to help should be positively
correlated. The interaction term then captures to what extent this relation is weakened if the donor
has a public score. The results are presented in Table 8 for the case of donors and recipients with full
score.22 We …nd again all the e¤ects from above. In addition, the positive e¤ect of the donor’s own score
is consistent with individual di¤erences in the propensity to help, because this implies that some donors
22The results do not change substantially if we include in the analysis all donors with a score and all recipients with a score
instead of only those with a full score. The only e¤ect is that the interaction e¤ect between the recipient’s score and the
dummy whether the donor has a score is weaker, though still signi…cant.
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Coe¢cient Std. Error z Pr > jzj
® 3.3968 0.3807 8.92 0.000
¯ 2.5351 0.4511 5.62 0.000
° -1.7843 0.4786 -3.73 0.000
± 3.0696 0.2298 13.36 0.000
´ -1.6749 0.3541 -4.73 0.000
const -4.0605 0.3444 -11.79 0.000
Table 8: Coe¢cients for the recipient’s score (®), for a dummy whether the donor has a score (¯), for the
interaction term (°), for the donors score (±), and for the interaction term (´) in probit model for the help
choice
have consistently a higher score and help more often. The interaction e¤ect between the donor’s score
and the dummy indicating whether he has a public score, however, is signi…cantly negative. This suggest
that having a public score increases the helping rate more if the donor has a low score. This is consistent
with strategic reputation building in the sense that donors with a low score try to increase their score, but
those with a very high score do not mind if it falls a bit.23 This behavior is rational because the payo¤
maximizing score is at a high, but not the maximal possible level.
Our a¢rmative result on the third hypothesis has a potentially important, though at the current state
somewhat speculative, implication. If the share of subjects with public score was higher, but the helping
rates (conditional on the recipient’s score) for donors with and without public score were not a¤ected,
average helping rates would be higher, but the incentives to help in order to build a reputation would be
weaker.
One could argue that the positive relation between the recipient’s score and the helping probability
does not result from indirect reciprocity, but rather from a learning process. Donors might want to …nd out
what is a successful score and may use the observed scores as orientation. Trying to adapt one’s own score
to the observed recipients’ scores would imply to help when one observes a high score and not to help when
23If we restrict the analysis to donors with a public score, the coe¢cient of the donor’s score is still positive and signi…cant,
but lower than for donors with a private score.
21
one observes a low score (though this should strictly be so only in early periods or if subjects are highly
myopic, because otherwise the total information one has gathered so far should dominate this period’s
recipient’s score). This potential interpretation, however, appears to be valid only for donors with score,
because donors without a score do not have an incentive to …nd out what constitutes a successful score.
The support for our third hypothesis, that the relation between recipient’s score and helping probability is
stronger for donors without a score, thus contradicts this interpretation and suggests that what we see is
indeed indirect reciprocity.
Result 5: Strategic subjects obtain signi…cantly higher payo¤s than non-strategic subjects. Reciprocal
subjects obtain lower payo¤s than non-reciprocal subjects.
Con…rming straightforward intuition, strategic reputation building pays, whereas reciprocity does not.
Table 9 shows the average payo¤s (relative to the average payo¤s in the session) of subjects by being
reciprocal and strategic, where we summarized the sub jects who were classi…ed as pure or strong strategists
as strongly strategic and those that were classi…ed as weakly or non-strategic as weakly strategic. Clearly,
the strongly strategic outperform the weakly strategic, which does not come as a surprise because being
strategic implies, conditioned on the public score, a lower private score and hence lower costs for helping.
The advantage of the strongly strategic players is, however, remarkably large.24 More importantly, it pays
not to be reciprocal, apparently because being reciprocal distracts from perfectly …ne-tuning one’s own
score (or, in case of private scores, is a pure waste).2 5 This indicates that in an evolutionary game based
24If we study the data in a more disaggregated way, we …nd that the payo¤ for the purely strategic is slightly higher than
that for the strongly strategic and the payo¤ for the weakly strategic is substantially higher than for the non-strategic. Since
the numbers of observations is too low for some categories in some sessions to derive meaningful results and since the largest
di¤erence is between strongly strategic and weakly strategic we aggregated the data in two categories for the present analysis.
25We see no reason why the individual subjects’ payo¤s relative to the session average should be dependent within one
session, hence we use the relative payo¤s of individuals as independent observations in the following tests. According to
both Mann-Whitney and two-sample t-tests, the di¤erences in relative payo¤s between strongly strategic and weakly strategic
subjects are signi…cant (p < 2% for the non-reciprocal, p < 1% for the reciprocal and p < 0:1% for the whole sample), but
those between reciprocal and non-reciprocal subjects are not (p> 10% for the strongly strategic, the weakly strategic and the
whole sample.) For a stricter test, which does not treat the relative payo¤s of individuals as independent, note that the average
relative payo¤s are larger for the strongly strategic than for the weakly strategic in all 5 sessions (for the non-reciprocal, for
the reciprocal as well as for the whole sample) and hence we can reject the hypothesis that the strongly strategic do not
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Strongly Strategic Weakly Strategic Total
Reciprocal 1.14 (20) 0.69 (19) 0.92 (39)
Non-Reciprocal 1.23 (23) 0.87 (18) 1.08 (41)
Total 1.19 (43) 0.78 (37)
Table 9: Payo¤s relative to average session payo¤ for pure or strongly strategic versus weakly or non-
strategic and for reciprocal versus non-reciprocal players, number of players in the respective category in
parantheses.
on this repeated helping game and with the experimentally observed player types, the purely strategic non-
reciprocal types would drive out the other types and would eventually undermine the cooperation. Given
that the relative payo¤ of the non-reciprocal strongly strategic players is almost twice that of the reciprocal
weakly strategic players, the evolutionary process would be quite fast for any su¢ciently payo¤-sensitive
dynamic.
Results 6: End-game e¤ects are consistent with the major patterns of behavior.
Figure 4 shows the development of the average helping rates in the …rst 40 and the second 40 periods.
While there is a clear drop in the last two periods in both cases, the helping rate is remarkably stable until
the third to last. Since the value of a high score decreases sharply towards the end of the experiment,
one might have expected helping rates to drop earlier. An analysis of the sources of the end-game e¤ect
is remarkably consistent with our classi…cation of sub jects into purely strategic, strongly strategic, weakly
strategic and non-strategic based on the comparison of behavior with and without public score. A subject
who helps primarily in order to strategically build a score would be expected to lower his or her helping
rate in the last periods when he or she has a public score. What we observe when we compare individual
subjects’ helping rates in the last two periods with their overall helping rates when they have a public score
is consistent with this expectation. Out of 17 subjects whom we classi…ed as purely strategic and who
have been a donor at least once in the last two periods, only 2 increase their helping rate, while 15 lower
do better at p = 5%: The non-reciprocal do better than the reciprocal in only four sessions and hence this test also misses
statistical signi…cance.
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it.26 The corresponding numbers for the strongly strategic players are 4 and 14, for the weakly strategic
they are 5 and 8 and for the non-strategic they are 4 (plus 4 with a constant helping rate) and 5. Thus
the end-game behavior clearly corresponds to our classi…cation of sub jects in terms of strategic behavior.
Subjects classi…ed as purely or strongly strategic exhibit a clear drop in helping behavior towards the end
while those classi…ed as weakly or non-strategic do not.2 7
Furthermore, the end-game e¤ect is almost exclusively restricted to the subjects with a public score,
consistent with our interpretation that a substantial share of helping behavior by donors with a public
score is driven by strategic reputation building, while that of sub jects with a private score is pure indirect
reciprocity. For players with a private score, the helping rate in the last two periods of the …rst phase is
nearly equal to the average rate (period 39: 25%, period 40: 35%, overall average: 38%, the rate is below
25% already in three earlier periods). In the second phase the helping rate is also only slightly below the
average (period 39: 28%, period 40: 19%, overall average: 31%, the rate is below 19% already in six earlier
periods). In contrast, for players with a public score, the helpings rate drops dramatically below the average
in the last two periods of both the …rst and the second phase (First phase: period 39: 33%, period 40: 29%,
overall average: 74%, the helping rate is above 50% in all previous periods and above 60% in all but one
previous periods; Second phase: period 39: 41%, period 40: 29%, overall average: 72%, the helping rate is
above 45% in all previous periods and above 58% in all but one previous period). In particular, the helping
rate of donors with a public score almost drops to the level of donors with a private score, which we would
expect if the di¤erence in their behavior is driven by strategic reputation building that cannot matter in
the last period.
Overall, the helping rate is somewhat lower in the second half of the experiment (51%) than in the …rst
(56%). In the individual sessions, this e¤ect is not consistent. The di¤erence is reversed in one session and
virtually zero (0.3%) in another.
26Most subjects were a donor only once in the last two periods. For these players, increasing the helping rate means helping
this one time and decreasing the helping rate means not helping this one time.
27Overall helping rates do not di¤er dramatically between the di¤erent categories in the phase when subjects have a score.
For purely strategic subjects it is 67%, for strongly strategic 68%, for weakly strategic 84%, and for non-strategic 72%.
Therefore, the observation concerning end-game e¤ects is not an artifact of di¤erences in overall helping rates.
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Figure 4: Average helping rates over all sessions for the respective 40 periods of the …rst and the second
half of the experiment
Seinen and Schram (2001) analyze the development of di¤erent group norms, which are apparent minimal
scores that donors demand from a recipient in order to help him or her and which they also try to achieve
themselves. They …nd that over time di¤erent groups tend to adopt di¤erent norms, since di¤erent groups
tend towards di¤erent helping rates and di¤erences between groups increase over time. We see relatively
little evidence for similar tendencies in our data. In both phases of the experiment, helping rates in the …rst
10 periods di¤er about as much as in periods 21-30. And they even di¤er less in the last 10 periods with
the exception of a stronger end-game e¤ect in session 3. That e¤ect can be attributed to the high number
of strongly strategic players in session 3 and thus it does not indicate the development of a di¤erent norm,
but rather more violations of the norm.
We also …nd some support for the alternative notion of indirect reciprocity that players help who have
recently been helped. When comparing the average help rates of donors who have been recipients in the
last interaction and have been helped with those who have been recipients in the last interaction and have
not been helped (see Table 10), we see that for all possible donor’s scores the help rate is higher for the
former (one has to consider donors with di¤erent scores separately, because otherwise one might incorrectly
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donor’s score 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
public score
-
0
1
0.64
0.82
0.57
0.91
0.73
0.78
0.55
0.92
0.69
private score
0.09
0.03
0.32
0.15
0.61
0.34
0.55
0.44
0.78
0.45
0.97
0.85
Table 10: Average helping rates for donors who have been recipients in the last interaction and have been
helped (top) and not been helped (bottom), by donor’s score and score status.
conclude that being helped increases the probability of helping if in fact donors who have helped more
frequently in the past do so in the present but are also helped more frequently). For donors with a (high)
public score, it is not entirely clear whether this result really indicates such a form of indirect reciprocity or
whether it rather results from sub jects realizing that a high score has bene…tted them. For donors without
public score the e¤ect is also present which provides more conclusive evidence for this form of indirect
reciprocity. It is, however, not very consistent in the individual sessions.
4 Related Literature
4.1 Standing Strategy as an Alternative to Image Scoring
Our experiment has pointed out that subjects react to the strategic incentives that are caused by future
donors’ indirect reciprocity. This implies that they face a trade-o¤ when they meet a recipient who has
a low score. If they are motivated by indirect reciprocity they want to punish this player. Punishing by
not giving, however, deteriorates the donor’s own score. Hence the donor’s indirectly reciprocal motivation
may be in con‡ict with the strategic incentives implied by future donors’ indirectly reciprocal actions.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), a system based on image scoring is
susceptible to exploitation by strategic score optimizers. These problems can only be avoided if higher
order information is provided, for instance, information about the score of the previous partners of the
current recipient.
Sugden (1986) analyzes a model with higher order information and what he calls “standing strategy”. A
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player is in “good standing” as long as he has helped or has refused to help a recipient not in good standing,
but loses good standing if he does not help a recipient in good standing. Leimar and Hammerstein (2001)
show that the standing strategy is evolutionarily stable if the horizon is su¢ciently long and the probability
of execution errors is small, but considerably larger than the probability of perception errors. They show in
simulations that even in a case where these conditions are not all ful…lled, the standing strategy dominates
the population and hence while it is not evolutionary stable, it is more robust than an indirectly reciprocal
strategy based on a cut-o¤ strategy.
Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2004a) conducted an experimental helping game where donors in one
treatment were informed only about the current recipient’s last choice in the donor role, but in another
treatment they were also informed about the recipient’s score in that interaction. The underlying model of
Bolton et al. (2004a) hence corresponds in the …rst treatment to image scoring models, while in the second
treatment it is conceptually closer to that analyzed by Sugden (1986). A crucial di¤erence, however, is that
in the situation analyzed by Sugden, there is an incentive both to punish a defector and to help a player
who has punished whereas in the underlying model of Bolton et al. there is no incentive to help a punishing
player because if one does not help a recipient who has not helped lately, future partners cannot detect
whether one has refrained to help an exploiter or a punisher. Hence cooperation based on good standing
is more robust than that based on the second order information in the underlying model of Bolton et al.
In Bolton et al. (2004a) the presence of second order information clearly increases cooperation, implying
that “deeper” information (looking back deeper into the history of play) fosters helping, whereas our results
suggest that “broader” information (a higher share of players with a public score) might also have adverse
e¤ects. The …rst order information has the strongest in‡uence when the second order information was
“help”, i.e. for the probability of being helped it is most important how one last treated another player who
has helped. This would be consistent with the conclusion that donors try to follow a standing strategy. If the
current recipient’s last recipient had helped the last time he was the donor (and hence was unambiguously
in good standing), the current recipient’s standing can be determined and thus guide the current donor’s
decision. In contrast, if the current recipient’s last recipient had not helped the last time he was the donor,
the information is not su¢cient to determine this player’s standing and hence also the current recipient’s
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standing. Therefore, the information on the current recipient is ambiguous and is thus not expected to
have a clear impact on the current donor’s decision.
The results of Bolton et al. (2004a) agree with ours to the extent that they …nd that strategic incentives
(e.g. costs) matter. In their study this is also shown by a clear end-game e¤ect, similar to our results.
Given that in our study the score is based on several periods, one might, however, expect helping rates to
drop substantially before the second to last period, which they do not. Bolton et al. (2004a) also …nd that
being helped increases the probability of helping in the next period, consistent with the alternative notion
of indirect reciprocity suggested by Boyd and Richerson (1989).
Similar to the approach by Bolton et al. (2004a), Milinski et al. (2001) compare treatments with …rst and
second order information, but they provide information about all the preceding choices of the recipient and
his or her previous recipients, not only about the respective last choices. Furthermore, subjects have the
opportunity to track also higher order information, because all decisions are made public and subjects are
assigned names throughout the experiment. While Milinski et al. (2001) …nd that second order information
is taken into account to some extent, they interpret their data to be overall rather in line with an image
scoring strategy than with a standing strategy because observed helping rates (for a speci…c group of
players, i.e. those that did not help a recipient who had not helped before and were hence not to blame
according to a standing strategy) are not signi…cantly di¤erent from expected helping rates under an image
scoring strategy (though they were higher) but are signi…cantly lower than expected helping rates under
a standing strategy. It appears that subjects took the information that was explicitly provided (…rst and
second order) into account, but were not capable of (or not interested in) keeping track of higher order
information.
To us, an e¤ective test of a standing strategy appears di¢cult to design. An experimental design that
provides su¢cient information for a standing strategy would either overwhelm subjects with information
(if it provides them with the necessary third, fourth and higher order information, as in Milinski et al.,
2001) or it would directly suggest to use a standing strategy by providing information about the standing
explicitly. Outside the laboratory, people might be able to develop e¢cient mechanisms to keep track of
others’ standing, whereas in an experiment, time might be too short to develop such an e¢cient mechanism.
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In particular, in non-anonymous interaction outside the laboratory, information about another’s past might
be retrieved from memory via emotional reactions, which appears to be much harder in an experiment where
identi…cation is only via …ctitious names or player numbers.
4.2 E¤ects of Reputation across Games
Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck (2002a, 2002b) study how an image score acquired in one game (or
individual decision) in‡uences the behavior in another. In the experiment by Milinski et al. (2002a) a
public goods game is combined with a helping game, where donors are also informed about the recipient’s
choice in preceding rounds of the public goods game. They …nd that contributions in the public goods
game deteriorate if …rstly eight periods of the public goods game are conducted and then eight rounds
of the helping game. In contrast, if rounds of the public goods game and the helping game alternate,
contributions in the public goods game stay at a substantially and signi…cantly higher level. Furthermore,
contributions in subsequent rounds of the public goods game decline quickly if subjects are informed that
no further rounds of the helping game follow, but do not if subjects are not given this information. These
results con…rm that sub jects clearly follow the strategic incentives to build a reputation. In the design,
however, elements of direct and indirect reciprocity are combined. Rewards and punishment in the helping
game of previous behavior in the public goods game are clearly a form of direct reciprocity because the
donor was a¤ected by the recipient’s behavior in the public goods game. Hence the main result shows that
subjects strategically react to the possibility of direct reciprocity, not indirect reciprocity. The experiment
provides again, however, clear evidence for indirect reciprocity (and even of a similar impact than that
of direct reciprocity), because the decisions in the helping game in‡uence the probability to be helped as
much as the decisions in the public goods game.
The experiment by Milinski et al. (2002b) shows that donations made to charity (UNICEF) signi…cantly
increase the probability to be helped in a helping game. Hence indirect reciprocity does not only occur
within closed groups, but also helping outsiders can improve one’s chances of receiving help.
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5 Conclusions
We have conducted an experimental helping game where at any time only half of the subjects have a
public score and hence a strategic incentive to help. Thus we can study both pure non-strategic indirect
reciprocity and the impact of strategic incentives. The interaction of donors with and without public score
is the fundamental di¤erence to the helping experiment by Seinen and Schram (2001). In their experiment,
all subjects could build up an image score (or none in the control treatment) and hence it is not possible
to clearly distinguish between helping choices that result purely from a motivation for indirect reciprocity
and helping choices that are driven by attempts to improve one’s own score.
From a general perspective, our separation between sub jects that can strategically build a reputation
and those that do not, provides a clean separation between non-sel…sh cooperative behavior (helping by
donors with private scores) and strategic cooperative behavior (the di¤erence in behavior of donors with
private and public scores). The average helping rate of donors with private score of more than 30% is as
clear evidence for the existence of non-strategic cooperative behavior as the substantially higher average
helping rate of donors with a public score is evidence for strategic reputation building.
From a more speci…c perspective, we are the …rst to …nd clear evidence for indirect reciprocity even in
the absence of strategic incentives for reputation building, but we also …nd very strong e¤ects of strategic
reputation building. Speci…cally, 80% of subjects react to strategic incentives, including more than 50%
whose helping rates more than double and 25% who only help when they have an incentive to do so.28
This is in contrast to the indirect evidence by Seinen and Schram (2001) who classify more than half of the
players as non-strategic and in particular …nd substantially more simple altruists and simple egoists, types
that are virtually absent in our experiment.
The pure indirect reciprocity that we …nd is inconsistent with the approaches towards reciprocity by
Rabin (1993) and by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) that cannot be generalized from direct to indirect
28An alternative explanation for the observed higher helping rates of donors with a public score could be that some donors
want to set an example for what they believe to be the right thing to do. Without a public score only the recipient becomes
aware of their choice, whereas with a public score their future donors learn their past behavior, which enhances the scope for
setting an example.
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reciprocity. It is, in contrast, consistent with the approaches by Levine (1998) and Charness and Rabin
(2002) that can easily be reinterpreted as general models incorporating both direct and indirect reciprocity.
We also …nd support for our hypothesis that the subjects who have a public score and hence a strategic
incentive to help, exhibit somewhat weaker reciprocal behavior than subjects who do not have a public
score. Hence while strategic incentives to build up an image score increase an individual’s general propensity
to help, it weakens the in‡uence of indirect reciprocity. A potential implication is that in a population
with a higher share of subjects with a public score, the incentives for strategic reputation building could
be weakened.
Concerning the empirical relevance of the invasion predicted by Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), we
clearly …nd strategic non-reciprocal players who also receive higher payo¤s than other types. This casts
some doubts on the evolutionary explanation for cooperation based on indirect reciprocity suggested by
Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) because the types predicted to undermine the cooperation by exploiting the
system are clearly present and more successful. Put di¤erently, the argument by Leimar and Hammerstein
that the set of potential types chosen in the simulations by Nowak and Sigmund is too restricted is not
only valid on theoretical grounds, but is also strongly supported by our experimental data. The exploiting
types are out there, so any simulation or evolutionary model that tries to explain some phenomenon in
the human society has to take them into account. Therefore, an evolutionary explanation for the presence
of indirect reciprocity (that is documented by several experiments, including ours) has to be richer in
structure to explain why reciprocal players might survive in the presence of non-reciprocal strategic players.
Furthermore, the helping rate of 37% by donors without a public score contradicts the evolutionary model
by Nowak and Sigmund. In their model indirect reciprocity evolves where players can build a reputation.
The donors without public score, however, cannot build a reputation. Their helping behavior would be
consistent with the Nowak and Sigmund approach only if one assumes that they behave maladaptively in
this environment. On the other hand, the subjects behave very adaptively, because donors with a public
score help twice as often and hence seem to clearly understand the incentives of reputation building. Hence
there appear to be further underlying motivations.
How can we explain the coexistence of pure indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in the
laboratory? It might be that indeed life outside the laboratory often does provide higher order information
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that allows people to apply, for example, a standing strategy. In such a rich environment, it is possible to
reward other people who not only have helped often, but who have been reciprocal and not to help people
who help indiscriminately and hence appear helpful but not reciprocal. In such an environment, a strategic
player would have to behave reciprocally. If intrinsically motivated reciprocal people and strategic players
interact in such an environment, they would not only have similar image scores, as in our experiment,
but would be indistinguishable in behavior and hence in payo¤s so that strategic players do not have an
evolutionary advantage. In our laboratory situation intrinsically motivated reciprocal players might try to
base their reciprocal behavior on the best information they can get, which is the image score. In contrast,
strategic players realize the strategic incentives to optimize their image score.29 3 0 If the world had an
information structure like our experiment and behavior were driven by evolution, indirect reciprocity would
not survive. The implication is that our experiment, and hence the model by Nowak and Sigmund does
not correctly re‡ect the information structure of the world outside the lab and hence that an evolutionary
explanation of the coexistence of indirect reciprocity and strategic behavior requires models with a richer
information structure. Alternatively, one might argue that the exploiters are a relatively new phenomenon
and that we are still in the take-over process. While this view might be correct, we consider it too depressing
to share.
As a …nal result, our experiment shows that evolutionary models can be tested in the laboratory, in
our case by proving the existence of a type that would undermine the process that drives the result of
the evolutionary model. Evolutionary explanations for a behavior are often vulnerable to the existence
of strategic types that successfully mimic a property that is the basis for the evolutionary advantage of
the …ttest type. Exposing sub jects in the laboratory to a situation as assumed by the evolutionary model
permits a test for the existence of these mimicking types.
29This is obviously not a complete explanation, because some players are clearly strategic, but still help (though at a lower
rate) when they do not have a public score.
30The reciprocal players could prevent being exploited by strategic players, but only at a high cost. If they play a trigger
strategy and stop being reciprocal once they have not been treated reciprocally (have not been helped although their score
is above the threshold), strategic players would have an incentive to be reciprocal. But in this case, a single deviation would
lead to a complete breakdown of cooperation.
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Appendix: Instructions (Not intended for publication)  
(Original Instructions were in German) 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
You are taking part in an economic experiment, which is being financed by various research promoting foundations. 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can - depending on the decisions you will make - influence your 
own earnings as well as the earnings of the other participants of this experiment. It is, therefore, important that you 
pay attention to the instructions given below. 
 
The instructions distributed are intended for your personal information only. Absolutely no communication whatso-
ever is allowed for the duration of the experiment. Please address questions you might have to us directly. Violation 
of this rule leads to the exclusion both from the experiment itself and from all pertaining payments. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods . During this experiment we do not deal with francs, but with points. Your in-
come from each period will, therefore, be calculated in points. The total amount of points achieved in the course of 
the experiment will be converted into francs at the rate of 
 
1 point equals 10 rappen [100 rappen = 1 Swiss Franc]. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you are allotted an endowment of 100 points, thus representing 10 francs. 
 
In each period you form a group with one other participant. These groups of two are in each period newly formed at 
random. It is possible, though not probable, that you will be linked with the same participant in two consecutive pe-
riods. You cannot recognize the other participants, and hence do not know whether you have been in a group to-
gether with the current other participant before. This guarantees the anonymity of your decision. 
 
Each group consists of one participant with the part A and one participant with the part B. Both parts are, in each 
period, randomly and independently assigned. The probability of being assigned part A for a period is 50 %, irre-
spective of the part held in the previous period. Therefore, it is possible that you will assume part A or part B in sev-
eral consecutive periods.  
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Specific Instructions for the Experiment’s Procedure 
 
Decisions to be made by the participants 
During each period, in which you assume part A, you determine whether or not you want to help the other partici-
pant of your group (who holds part B). If you assume part B no decision is required from you. If you, as the holder 
of part A, decide to help the other participant of your group, you will be charged with a cost of 6 points, and the 
other participant of your group is given 15 points. If you decide not to help the other participant of your group, you 
suffer no cost, and the other participant receives nothing, resulting, for both of you, in the same amount of points as 
at the beginning of the period. 
 
Participants’ information types 
The participants differ from each other insofar as other participants are, or are not, informed of the decisions made. 
Participants, whose decisions are communicated to the other participants, are referred to as Info types. The experi-
ment comprises two stages consisting of 40 periods each. At stage one, i.e. during the first 40 periods, one half of 
the participants are info types. At stage two, the other half of the participants become info types. Thus, you will, like 
all other participants, be an info type either during the first 40 periods or during the second 40 periods. You will 
always know if you are an info type or not. If during the first 40 periods you were an info type, we will inform you at 
the end of these 40 periods that for the rest of the experiment you will no longer be an info type and vice-versa. Re-
gardless whether you are an info type or not, you can in each period be matched both with another info type or to a 
non-info type. 
 
Information on info types 
The last five decisions made by the info types are being computer-saved, i.e. saved will be the number of times an 
info type (with part A) granted help and the number of times he denied help. When an info type then assumes part 
B, this information is given to the other participant of the group (assuming part A). This means that the participant 
with part A learns how many times the participant with part B granted help during the last five periods and how 
many times he did not. If at this stage the participant with part B assumed part A in less than five periods, the par-
ticipant with part A is informed of decisions B made in these periods. 
 
If a participant is not an info type, no information on his decision-making is saved. In particular this means that no-
one is informed about the decisions made at the stage where one is not an info type. Thus if at stage two of the ex-
periment you are an info type, no information on the decisions you made at stage one will be passed on to another 
participant. 
 
Participants with part B are given no information on participants with part A. 
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If you are an info type, whose current decisions as participant with part A are passed on to later participants assum-
ing part A, you are, at the beginning of a period, informed of how you decided during the last five periods with part 
A (or during less than these five periods if you assumed part A less than five times). This information is submitted 
to you regardless of which part, A or B, you assume. 
 
Stage two of the experiment 
On completion of the 40 periods of stage one and after a short break we will get started with stage two, again con-
sisting of 40 periods. The info types of stage one are no longer info types, and the non-info types of stage one be-
come the info types of stage two. At stage two, all information on the decisions made at stage one are no longer 
available. This means that the number of periods with part A about which information is released, starts at zero for all 
participants. 
 
However, the amount of points earned at stage one are carried over to stage two. 
 
 
Procedure on the Computer 
 
The screen shown to both participants is divided in two sections. The upper section of the screen is independent on 
whether you assume part A or part B. 
 
Information given in the upper section of the screen 
Each period reveals, in the upper section of the screen, the part you assumed in the previous period as well as the 
decision the participant with part A made in the last period (see figures 1 and 2 below). Furthermore, you are shown 
your actual balance of points. As an info type you will also see how many times during the last five periods as A (or 
during all previous periods as A, if they amount to less than five) you granted help to the participant with part B and 
how many times you denied it (see the example in figure 1). This is for your information. In the exa mple in Figure 1 
you have been the participant with part A during the last period, granting help to the participant with part B. During 
the last five periods with part A, you granted help twice and denied it three times. The current balance is 121 points. 
The example in Figure 2 shows the upper section of the screen, if you are not an info type. During the last period 
you assumed part B and were granted help. Your current balance is 121 points. 
 
Decision-making section for participants A 
If you are the participant with part A, you make your decision in the lower section of the screen. If the other partici-
pant of your group, i.e. the participant with part B, is an info type, you are informed about B’s last five decisions (i.e. 
about the last five periods where he assumed part A). In the event that the other participant of your group, i.e. the 
participant with part B, is no info type, you are informed about the fact that no information is released to you. The 
screen below shows that the participant with part B granted help three times and denied it twice during the last five 
periods where he assumed the part of A. 
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Below you will see the following question: “Do you help participant B in this period? ” beside the two fields “Yes” 
and “No”. Mouse-click one of these fields and activate the “OK” button. If you choose “Yes” your balance of points 
will be reduced by 6 points and participant B’s balance will be increased by 15 points. If you choose “No” neither 
your nor participant B’s balance will be changed. 
 
Besides, you will learn if you are an info type, which in this example applies. Thus your decision will in future peri-
ods, where you assume part B, be revealed to the participant with part A as long as these decisions belong to your 
last five decisions as the participant with part A and as long as you are at the same stage of the experiment. 
 
Figure 1: Screen for participants with part A 
Period 
                                         13    of    40 
 
In the last period you were participant A. You granted help. 
 
 
As A during the last 5 periods 
 
You granted help twice 
You denied help three times. 
 
 
Current balance of your points: 121 
 
 
During this period you are participant A 
 
Your participant B during the last 5 periods as A 
Granted help three times 
denied help twice. 
 
 
Do you help participant B in this period    ¡   Yes 
                                                                 ¡    No 
 
 
Your decisions will be revealed to your future participants A 
 
OK 
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Lower section of the screen for participants with part B 
 
The lower part of the screen only informs you that during this period you are not to make any decision. 
 
Figure 2: Screen for participants with part B 
 
Period 
                                         16    of    40 
 
In the last period you were participant B. You were granted help. 
 
 
Current balance of your points: 121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant B. During this period you make no decision. 
 
 
 
continue 
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Control Questionnaire 
 
Please answer all questions. Wrong answers have no consequences whatsoever! Address any questions to us! 
 
1. Participant A has 121 points, participant B has 112 points. Participant A helps participant B. The balance of 
points of the participants is: 
 
  participant A: ............ 
 
  participant B: ............ 
 
2. Participant A has 145 points, participant B has 127 points. Participant A denies participant B help. The bal-
ance of points of the participants is: 
 
  participant A: ............ 
 
  participant B: ............ 
 
3. Suppose you are an info type. During the last five periods you made the following decisions: “help denied”, 
“help denied”, “help granted”, “help granted”, and “help denied” (in this sequence). You are now again A. In 
the event that you now help and that in the next period you assume part B: which information on your deci-
sions will be released to participant A? 
 
  you granted help ............ times 
 
  you denied help ............ times 
 
4. Suppose that during the first stage of the experiment you are an info type. In how many periods, at the most, 
is the decision you make in period 37 revealed to another participant? 
 
5. Suppose you had the part of B three consecutive times. What is the probability of you again assuming part B 
during the next period? 
